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I explore the role of Philosophy for Children (P4C) and critical pedagogy in pre-college 
education--what is the purpose of engaging with children on philosophical questions and how ought 
teachers ask such questions? This paper examines the current and past approaches of P4C through 
the work Brazilian educator Paulo Freire, and attempts to situate P4C within the framework of 
critical pedagogy, resulting in a synthesis I call "critical P4C." Implementing critical P4C has the 
capacity to create communities of inquiry around questions of agency and freedom that are central 
to critical pedagogy. Critical P4C offers strategies for engaging students in discussions relevant to 
social issues and breaks the boundaries between “school life” and the students' everyday life 
outside the classroom. 









































Philosophy for Children (P4C), an effort by philosophers and educators to bring philosophy young 
people, was initiated in part to address concerns about the state of the mainstream education that 
they felt did not meet the demands of modern democratic society. P4C pioneers such as Matthew 
Lipman (1973) decided to introduce critical education into the curriculum by having students 
experience the process of reasoning about philosophical problems, providing them with a tool set 
that they could apply to new problems (Brandt, 1988; Beyer, 1990). Students would thus be more 
equipped to make rational choices that take into account the interests of others and themselves. 
P4C had the goal of introducing more voices of the community in conversation, because this has a 
greater chance of bringing about “a general and appropriately representative consensus” 
(Vansieleghem, 2005, p. 20). Children’s voices were particularly important to include in this 
conversation, in part for their natural capacity for questioning (Vansieleghem, 2005, p. 20) and 
because they often ask questions that might not occur to adults. 
 
This paper argues for an approach to doing philosophy with young people that combines aspects of 
the American P4C movement with the tradition of critical pedagogy in the work of Brazilian 
educator Paulo Freire. Situating P4C within the framework of critical pedagogy can both increase 
the potential for P4C to improve young people’s reasoning skills and serve as a way to inject critical 
pedagogy into schools. P4C and critical pedagogy have overlapping goals of enabling students to 
understand the world around them and similar assumptions about the capacities for reasoning, 
questioning, and understanding they possess.  
 
One of the justifications of public education is that it provides students with the tools they need to 
participate in civil society.  Along with this, students are socialized into accepting the norms of 
society. Very rarely is any time spent with students engaging in a dialogue with their peers about 
the social world they will eventually join. Students aren’t given the chance to engage in social and 
political conversations in the classroom where an increasing amount of time is devoted to teaching 
for standardized tests (Kohn, 2000; McNeil, 2000, ch. 7; Aronowitz, 2008).  
 
Furthermore, music, art, literature, and other components of a humanities education are taking a 
backseat to technical and vocational education (McNeil, 2000, ch. 4). The humanities can help 
students understand others through their language, culture, and history and how people have 
attempted to make sense of the world. Learning how to evaluate competing sense-making 
attempts and how to respond reasonably are paramount if society is to be predicated on a rational 
consensus arising out of a plurality of ideas (Vansieleghem & Kennedy, 2011, p. 176). Lipman 
(1973) felt that subjects such as mathematics and reading are crucial to good thinking, though 
they are not sufficient to develop the kind of thinking students need (p. 2).  
 
The question for Lipman, and critical pedagogists, is not which subjects should or should not be 
taught but how they are taught that is primary; for Lipman the problem is that children are taught 
to think about a variety of subjects, but not to think about thinking, nor are students stimulated to 
think independently (p, 7). Correspondingly, educators in the tradition of critical pedagogy have 
applied their principles to a variety of topics, such as mathematics, attempting to teach the subject 
“for social justice” (Stinson et al., 2012, p. 79) or to “read the world” using that subject (Gutstein, 
2003, p. 44).  
 
In this paper, I will first provide a brief discussion of the P4C movement in the United States, 
beginning with the work of Matthew Lipman. That will be followed by an examination of critical 
pedagogy emerging from Freire’s Pedagogy of the Oppressed. Then I will discuss the similarities 
and differences between the two pedagogical traditions. I next argue that for P4C to be part a truly 





philosophy lessons can provide an entry point for discussing the political and social issues that are 
central to critical pedagogy with students. What emerges is a synthesis of these pedagogy 
traditions that I label “critical P4C.” Finally, I develop suggestions for teaching Critical P4C and 
speculate on possible implications of its practice in the classroom. Implementing critical P4C has 
the capacity to create communities of inquiry around questions of agency and freedom that are 
central to critical pedagogy. Critical P4C offers strategies for engaging students in discussions 
relevant to social issues and breaks the boundaries between “school life” and the students' 
everyday life outside the classroom. 
 
This paper is meant to be accessible to primary and secondary teachers, particularly those who 
wish to engage their students in discussions of philosophy, particularly political and social 
philosophy. Specific background knowledge isn’t necessary to facilitate these discussions, rather I 
will address the orientation the teacher should have toward her students, toward what counts as 
knowledge, and toward the goals of education. I will be focusing on the early thinkers in both P4C 
and critical pedagogy--for the former that is mainly Matthew Lipman and Gareth Matthews, for the 
latter, I will discuss the work of Paulo Freire--to show the principles and goals they share and how 
their differences can compliment each other. 
 
Philosophy for Children 
 
Proponents of P4C have generally agree on the premise of the movement--bringing philosophy 
lessons to pre-college students--however, they differ on what these lessons should look like in 
practice (Vansieleghem, 2005). Nancy Vansieleghem and David Kennedy (2011) divide the history 
of P4C in the US into two generations that differ both in their methodologies but also their 
understandings of what it is to be a child and the role that education plays in development. 
Matthew Lipman and the Institute for the Advancement of the Philosophy of Children spearheaded 
the first generation, emerging around the late 1960s, followed by the work of Gareth Matthews and 
others in the 1970s.  
 
The second generation of P4C is marked by the use of philosophy as a “means of reconstructing 
relations of power and agency in the classroom, and for communicating and reflecting upon 
personal meanings, with a goal of facilitating the self-actualisation of conscious moral actors” (p. 
173). Representatives of this generation, such as David Kennedy, Karin Murris,  Karel Van der 
Leeuw, and Ann Margaret Sharp, tend to reject many of the assumptions of what counts as 
“philosophy.” In “Can Children Do Philosophy?” Karin Murris (2000) writes that P4C is partly a 
criticism of the way of doing philosophy that Lipman compared to “memorising the inscriptions in a 
graveyard; the memorising of a collection of names and dates” (p. 274).1 Murris argues that doing 
philosophy with children could lead to philosophy becoming more relevant and raises questions 
about the ideal philosopher; with solitary, independent rationality, P4C adds “dialogue, 
embodiment and the imagination” (p. 276).  
 
The drive to bring philosophy into the educational curriculum in the United States began with the 
work of Matthew Lipman. Lipman's (1974) book, Harry Stottlemeier's Discovery, sought to develop 
methods for creating philosophical dialogues with young people. Soon after, the Institute for the 
Advancement of the Philosophy of Children (IAPC) was established at Montclair State University; its 
mission is to develop educational content, create affiliations with organizations whose work is 
related to P4C, and support research in teaching philosophy (“Institute for the Advancement of 
Philosophy for Children (IAPC),”). P4C has been largely situated in a liberal education framework, 
one that promotes democratic values with the aim of preparing the students for their future 
                                               
1
 Murris (2000) makes a point to use the abbreviation PwC instead of P4C, the latter she associates with Lipman and the 
IAPC’s work. PwC, for her is a broader term, inclusive of educators who do not agree that Lipman’s method and the 





citizenship (Bleazby, 2006) through the creation of a community of inquiry (COI) (Cevallos-
Estarelles & Sigurdardottir, 2000) Lipman’s understanding of education was influenced largely by 
the philosophy of American pragmatist John Dewey and psychologists Lev Vygotsky and Jean 
Piaget (Juuso, 2007). 
 
Juuso (2007) writes, “Matthew Lipman has constructed P4C based on the thinking of the best 
known advocates of early American pragmatism, Charles Sanders Peirce, John Dewey and George 
Herbert Mead. Especially the last two of them are the direct pivotal figures behind P4C” (p. 221). In 
fact, Lipman became fascinated with Dewey’s work while serving in the military and enrolled in 
Columbia University, where Dewey himself taught, to study philosophy. Lipman was impressed with 
the ‘practicality’ of Dewey’s thinking which convinced him to study philosophy (p. 16). 
 
For Dewey, students excel when they are allowed to experience and interact with their education. 
In Experience and Education, Dewey (1938) makes a distinction between traditional and 
progressive education. Traditional education, like Lipman’s standard paradigm and Freire’s banking 
method, contains a body of information and skills that have been found to be correct, and the work 
of the teacher is transmitting this to students. Education is also responsible for the moral training 
of students by promoting habits that conform to previously-develop standards and rules of conduct 
(p. 17).  
 
Dewey advocated for a new education that reflects the primacy of the role of experience in 
learning. Education arises through experience but not all experiences have the same educational 
value. Some experiences, including those that occur in traditional education, can be mis-educative. 
Dewey judges the quality of experience in two ways. One is the feeling of agreeableness or 
disagreeableness associated with that experience, but more importantly, is the effect that 
experience has on fostering or inhibiting future experiences (p. 23-25). Thus new education is “a 
development within, by, and for experience” (p. 28). 
 
Lipman promoted using stories and narratives with philosophically-interesting content that were 
appealing to students as a catalyst for discussion. The students are then asked open-ended 
questions and invited to reflect on the text. The text is not necessary for a P4C discussion; many 
begin with a group activity, thought experiment, or just introducing a concept, such as fairness or 
friendship, that children are familiar with. However Lipman understood that parents and teachers 
who don’t have advanced degrees in philosophy would need some help in engaging philosophical 
discussions. He wrote Harry Stottlemeier's Discovery, and number of other works, intended to 
stimulate critical thinking and moral judgment but also to show the importance of reasoning, 
questioning, and conceptual exploration. 
 
Lipman incorporated the community of inquiry concept from Peirce and Dewey. Peirce intended the 
community of inquiry as a model of scientific inquiry; Dewey expanded the concept and applied it 
to education. In a community of inquiry, knowledge is within a social context and agreement 
between the inquirers is necessary for legitimization of that knowledge, unlike traditional models of 
inquiry that tend to be individual and solitary quests to know a static, unchanging world. Peirce 
(1992/1998), and other pragmatist philosophers, questioned the individualist idea of inquiry, that 
the solitary thinker can begin with doubt and end with only certainty. Peirce questioned this 
account for a number, instead modeling inquiry on science in which no individual is the ultimate 
judge of certainty. In science the question of certainty is put aside once scientists come to agree 
on a theory (vol.1 p. 29). Dewey (1897) believed that the challenges of social spaces were 
necessary for learning. The demands of social life cause children to conceive of themselves as a 
member of a group, and to understand what their actions mean in social terms (p. 77). To Dewey 






For Lipman (2003), a community of inquiry occurs in what he termed a reflective paradigm where 
teachers guide students in a reasonable and judicious manner with education as the goal. He 
contrasts this with the standard paradigm. In the standard paradigm, knowledge is transmitted to 
the student in discrete, unambiguous units from the teacher who stands as authority on what is or 
isn’t legitimate knowledge (p. 18-19). By giving students the chance to think about the world, the 
reflective paradigm creates a space for a community of inquiry to form. 
 
In the community of inquiry, students are provided a stimulus, such as a story, picture book, or a 
philosophical paradox, and are then asked to develop questions about aspects of the stimulus they 
find puzzling, problematic, false, or ambiguous. Following that, the students engage in discussion 
with each other to put forth ideas, respond to others’ ideas, and ask new questions based on the 
ideas of their co-inquirers. Over the course of the discussion, the questions become more 
thoughtful and reflective, and ideally, the discussion would continue until all participants are 
satisfied with the answer. The role of the teacher is to ask guided questions and work to inspire 
students to think about the world in a way that builds on their ideas and those of their peers 
(Fisher, 2001, p. 71; Lipman, 2003, ch. 4). 
 
Following Lipman, other philosophers and educators took philosophy with young people in new 
directions. Questions about the developmental process as it relates to philosophy were explored, 
and this led to different views children and philosophy. For Lipman, the child is a young philosopher 
who can benefit from doing philosophy. Lipman’s approach was controversial in the sense that 
many think that subjects like philosophy should be avoided until students are a certain age.  
 
In Philosophy and the Young Child, Gareth Matthews (1980) questions assumptions about 
children’s cognitive capacity and development, particularly view that children master concepts 
progressively. The idea Matthews rejects is that children, as they develop, become more mature in 
their thinking process and that at certain ages children are unable to grasp certain concepts until 
their thinking has sufficiently progressed. The standard account of childhood development as 
understood by psychologists raises problems for doing philosophy with children. Psychologists 
might be skeptical about the capacity for children to understand philosophical ideas. Matthews 
responds by arguing that this misconstrues the activity of philosophy--it is hard to say what counts 
as “progress” in philosophy. Also, philosophical progress is not normally part of the standard 
development of people of any age group. Furthermore, when doing philosophy, children engage in 
conceptual explorations that many psychologists would deem childish or irrational since the goal is 
not to have more concrete views on the world that are consistent with one’s peers, but rather to 
question the standard “conviction.” Matthews writes, “... it is the deviant response that is most 
likely to be philosophically interesting” (p. 38). 
 
Matthews, instead of doing philosophy with or for children, developed what he called “dialogues 
with children.” Matthews and those of the P4C movement following Lipman, broke from earlier 
thinking by emphasizing the difference in the way children think and philosophize rather than 
working for analytic uniformity in reasoning. Children’s philosophy, for Matthews, was “a form of 
desire—of the opportunity for children to explore and articulate what they have not said or even 
thought before,” not an opportunity to engage in strictly logical thinking (Vansieleghem & Kennedy, 
2011, p.176). In Dialogues with Children, Matthews (1984) has two aims in mind. One is providing 
adults with philosophical questions to ask children. Each chapter covers a particular topic from the 
canon of philosophy using anecdotal conversations between young people, generally aged eight to 
eleven, with Matthews’ reflections. His second aim is to show an example of a relationship with 
children that is not based on condescension (p. 3). 
 
Matthews (1994) saw children as capable philosophers due to their inherent sense of wonder, and 
that what they are doing is legitimately philosophy. When children have philosophical dialogues, 





the real thing …” (p. 34). Matthews writes that it is difficult to categorize philosophical thinking as 
cognitively ‘mature’ or ‘immature.’  
 
In the first generation of P4C, children are capable of thinking philosophically in a way that 
resembles adults, and bringing philosophy into the classroom gives them a chance to practice 
reasoning and develop moral judgment. After Lipman, philosophers working with children began to 
value children’s thinking because it differs from adult thinking. Matthews (1984) was interested in 
the ways children think that are not captured by developmental psychology, because they are 
“primarily concerned with the normal and the standard” (p. 116). There is little agreement on 
counts as normal and standard thinking in philosophy, so Matthews argues that developmental 
psychology might have nothing to say about the philosophical capacities of young people (p. 118). 
It is the unique ways in which children understand and take part in philosophical questioning, that 
differed from those of adults, that became the crucial factor. Children, because they think 
differently than adults, have contributions to add to philosophical discussion that “may be quite as 
valuable as any we adults have to offer” (p. 3). 
 
Philosophy in the second generation, Vansieleghem and Kennedy write, “appears as a form of 
communal deliberation that stimulates critical reflection on existing power relations, these being 
envisaged as historical constructions that are or should be open to reconstruction” (p. 176). 
Dialogue becomes the core of the educational process with the goal of of creating “a free space in 
which all persons involved in the inquiry have an equal chance to bring their arguments forward in 
the interest of a an emergent, rationally founded consensus” (p. 176). Instead of being presented 
with the idea of what the philosopher is and taught to emulate that, children in dialogues are 
shown and given a chance to participate in what philosophers do. In this generation, children are 
encouraged to question even the norms of human thinking and action--the dialogue is a space 
where children are able to ask “why?” such and such is the case. 
 
For example, Matthews (1984) compares a story that he presented to a class of twenty adults to a 
group of seven children. The story centers on whether or not plants can have desires or wants. One 
difference between the responses from the two groups is the commitment to a divide between 
thinking literally and figuratively. Adults could concede that plants figuratively have a desire for 
water, but not literally. Children, on the other hand, were more free in their use of imagination to 
believe that plants could have desires. Adults might know more about the actual life of plants, such 
as the biochemistry of photosynthesis, which is important for the question of whether they can 
desire; but children excel in dialogue by more readily thinking beyond the actual to the possible life 
of plants (p. 18).  With Matthews, children’s insights are valuable in relation to the gap between 
how they think and how adults think.  
 
The second generation emphasizes the importance of critically engaging with the concept of 
thinking and on the relations of power that underlie these norms (Vansieleghem and Kennedy, 
2011, p. 176). Accepting the idea of objective truth that is true for anyone and for all time is not 
the goal for the new generation of P4C. Instead there is a focus on the varieties of thinking done by 
people in different contexts. A rational exchange of opinions is still the goal, but, as Vansieleghem 
and Kennedy (2011) point out, “[t]here is, however, no longer understood to be one best way of 
reasoning, for collective reason, it is held, is shaped and articulated by the social community in 
which it operates” (p. 178). So rather than be taught there is one particular method of thinking 
about a problem, philosophy helps children to reflect on their own views and relate them to others. 
Educators in this generation of P4C stress the importance of children’s participation in a common 
reality that is increasingly interconnected and rapidly changing (Van der Leeuw, 2009, p. 113).  
 
This generation of P4C has much in common with the tradition of critical pedagogy, particularly in 





and unambiguous. In the new P4C, children philosophize about different ways of conceptualizing 
the common reality that we all share. No one perspective necessarily has the privilege of “truth.”  
 
With critical pedagogy the assumption of a stable common reality is questioned, and students and 
teachers are encouraged to think about how we shape the common social reality. Society is not 
just a thing that is there, waiting for children to become adults and take part in preordained roles; 
critical pedagogists draw attention to the subjectivity of people within the public sphere and the 
forces of oppression and domination that silence some voices but not others. Freirean critical 
pedagogy has unique contributions to add to the project of P4C but also raises questions about the 
role of teacher and student in a philosophical dialogue. Using Freire as a “starting point” to move 
beyond the current generation, critical P4C intends to go further, not just questioning the 
distinction between adult and child in philosophical inquiry but also the between teacher and 




Critical pedagogy stems from Paulo Freire's efforts teaching campesinos in Brazil. Freire’s theory of 
education is very intricate and touches on nearly every aspect of human existence in the world. 
Here I will limit myself to considering aspects that are relevant to contemporary educators, and not 
on, say, issues pertinent to activists, progressives, and others not engaged in teaching-related 
activities. Freire examined the connection between education and poverty and was led to believe 
that education held the potential for promoting social justice and transforming society. Education 
could not be separated from political considerations nor could it be considered neutral.   
 
For Freire, the purpose of education is human liberation and begins from experience. Education has 
the capacity to reinforce the passivity of students or challenge social forces that limit human 
liberation (Wallerstein, 1987, p. 33). He calls the dominant non-dialogic style the “banking method” 
of education. The teacher is the store of knowledge which is “deposited” into the students' minds. 
The students later show they have learned by repeating that information back to the teacher 
(Freire, 2005, ch. 2).  
 
This, Freire argues, maintains hierarchical systems of domination and oppression. He advocates for 
a liberatory teaching that he calls “problem-posing” education that is rejects deposit-making. 
Instead the focus of education is “the posing of the problems of human beings in their relations 
with the world” (p. 79). Problem-posing education sees the essence of thinking as intentional, that 
is about things or pointing to things in the world, and relational, connected to others via 
communication. 
 
The principles of critical pedagogy establish relationships between student-teachers and teacher-
students. Knowledge is constructed in the educational interaction, rather than transmitted to 
students from teachers. Teachers who wish to be progressive ought to be concerned with 
pedagogy, or their method of teaching. The teacher, to avoid becoming reactionary and reinforcing 
authoritarian practices, must be aware of how she is teaching.  
 
For Freire (1987), there is no neutral position; the progressive teacher must have a political and 
pedagogical understanding of teaching (p. 212). When the goal is to teach students how to learn, 
instead of just transmitting information that is to be memorized, progressive educators should 
work toward eroding the dichotomy between teacher and student. This is because the students 
must “enter into the discourse of the teacher, appropriating for themselves the deepest significance 
of the subject being taught (p. 213). The teacher has to give up the exclusive authority to name 
the world,’ and not think of her student as an “empty vessel to be filled,” but as an active 






Freire’s major work, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, does not provide a simple plan for teaching, 
rather the attitude the teacher, or facilitator, adopts toward her students and the educational 
process is the main concern. The role of teacher changes from an authoritative source of truth to a 
facilitator of learning. The pedagogical roles change in a Freirean project; the teacher-of-the-
students and the students-of-the-teacher become teacher-students and student teachers. For 
Freire, critical pedagogy cannot be imported but must be reinvented anew each time it is practiced. 
The content of the discussions is based on the world the students find themselves in. The facilitator 
of the critical pedagogical project doesn’t employ prepackaged lesson plans but must investigate 
her students’ environments and lived situations prior to the class session.  
 
Without knowing something about the students’ lives, we risk further alienating them from an 
educator that from their point of view seems disconnected from the real world. Patricia Reynolds 
(2007) argues that teachers should go even further than this and work to alleviate problems that 
students face in their lives. The No Child Left Behind Act has caused schools to focus on teaching 
for standardized tests which tends to exclude certain topics, such as the distribution of power in 
society, from the curriculum (p. 53). The problems posed in problem-posing education are those 
that teachers have just as much to learn as students, and, in Freire’s view, teachers need to 
abandon some of their epistemological authority so they can learn along with students in a 
dialogue. 
 
Dialogue, in Freire’s view, is the situation when people come together to name the world they are 
in. Naming the world is a continuous process--the named world appears again and requires a new 
name. In a dialogue this process of action and reflection works towarding find the authentic word. 
Freire calls this work praxis. For this dialogue to occur, however, certain conditions must be in 
place. Dialogue fails when some are denied their right to speak, to do so is to dehumanize them, 
since Freire views the act of speaking to be fundamental to human beings. Dialogue is impossible 
when only some members have ability to speak with authority about the world and when others’ 
voices are ignored (p. 88). 
 
Freire also emphasizes the importance of love as a component of dialogue. Love is the courage to 
be committed to others whose voices have been denied. For the person attempting a dialogue, love 
of life, the world, and people is essential--”[l]ove is at the same time the foundation of dialogue 
and dialogue itself” (p. 89). Love, in this context, means listening to and valuing the voice of the 
oppressed. Dialogue also requires humility, as in the absence of arrogance. The educator who 
places herself above others or who is worried about being displaced from her position of privilege 
closes herself off from the dialogue. A lack of humility creates a distance from the people, and 
prevents her from taking part in the naming of the world. Freire warns against thinking in terms of 
“utter ignoramuses” and “perfect sages” rather “there are only people who are attempting, 
together, to learn more than they now know” (p. 90). Humility is letting go of the arrogance of 
being the teacher and the wish to direct the dialogue in directions that silence some voices. 
 
Faith is another requirement for dialogue, however what Freire writes of is a faith in the power of 
humans to engage in the naming and renaming of the world and faith in the work of all humans to 
free themselves from oppression, that is “to be more fully human” (p. 90). Freire’s work is inspired 
by his Catholic faith, though the faith in a dialogue is a trust in people, and is not connected to any 
specific religious tradition. It is a faith in the idea that people want to be free and the way to 
become so is through dialogue. Love, humility, and faith in others together create trust, another 
necessary component of dialogue. What the speaker says should match her true intentions; words 
should not be taken lightly (p. 91). The participants in the dialogue need to trust each other to be 






Dialogue cannot occur without hope. There must be a sense that something will come out of the 
dialogue. Without hope, the dialogue will be “empty and sterile, bureaucratic and tedious (p. 92). 
Hope prevents people from falling into despair due to their incompleteness. For Freire (1998), hope 
causes humans to be seekers and explorers as it is “necessary impetus” of the project of becoming 
more fully human (p. 69). Lastly, a dialogue needs critical thinking; however, Freire’s sense of 
critical thinking differs from the common use of the term as implying the use of logic and analytical 
thinking to evaluate evidence. For Freire (2005), critical thinking is the reflecting component of 
praxis but is never separate from action. To think critically is to see the “indivisible solidarity” that 
connects people to the world (p. 92). Humans are not outside of a world of static essences, rather 
reality is dynamic, transforming through the action of people.  
 
Freire reinforced these requirements for dialogue when addressing the coordinators of “cultural 
circles” in rural Chile. Freire (1971) wrote, “In order to be a good coordinator for a ‘cultural circle,’ 
you need, above all, to have faith in man, to believe in his possibility to create, to change things. 
You need to love. You must be convinced that the fundamental effort of education is the liberation 
of man, and never his ‘domestication’” (p. 61). The cultural circle shouldn’t be thought of like a 
traditional school. The teacher is not a provider of absolute knowledge to passive ignorant 
students. In a cultural circle, discussion is lively and creative, where participants have varying 
levels of knowledge but everyone works together to know more.  
 
Critical pedagogy, and the methods developed within its framework, can help us examine the 
structure of educational practice and correct for what Freire (2005) calls dehumanization, which “is 
a distortion of the vocation of becoming more fully human” (p. 44); critical pedagogy is intended to 
be a tool for both the oppressors and the oppressed to become aware of their common 
dehumanization (p. 48). Freire notes that there are many well-meaning educators who use in the 
banking method of education but must abandon this method to fully engage in the struggle for 
liberation.  
 
Education is a key part of this struggle since liberation cannot be given to the oppressed, instead it 
comes as a result of their own ‘critical consciousness.’ (p. 67). This consciousness, which is 
normally left untranslated as conscientização, is a deep “attitude of awareness” (p. 109). 
Conscientização is the process of learning to see dehumanizing and oppressive elements in the 
political, social, and economic world and to take action against them (p. 33fn). The first step to a 
critical consciousness is literacy. Learning to read can be understood in the sense of grasping of 
letters and symbols, but there is a deeper level of literacy Freire is concerned with. There are those 
who are “illiterate” in the sense that they can read the words on a page, but do not fully 
understand the meanings of what they read, such as someone reading about worker layoffs and 
corporations relocating their factories overseas and not connect these two points. Literacy here 
means not just reading the newspapers but not being taken in by biases and propaganda. 
Conscientização involves a recognition of how the oppressed have been silenced and taught to 
internalize a negative image of themselves. 
 
There are a number of conceptual links between Freire’s work and each of the generations of P4C 
in the United States. Below I will examine these links in an effort to push the P4C movement in a 
more critical direction; following that, I will point out the major differences of the traditions. 
 
Freire and Lipman 
 
Freire and those within the P4C movement share an antipathy towards the traditional structure of 
the classroom and its method of knowledge transmission--what Lipman calls the standard 
paradigm and Freire the banking method. This classroom is dominated by the teacher who is the 





ideal student in this classroom is a passive receptacle of information, skills, and values. Lipman and 
Freire reject the view of knowledge as static, instead, stressing the importance of dialogue in the 
construction of knowledge; however, Lipman’s critique of schooling is concerned with the 
authoritarian structure of the teacher-student relationship, and Freire, though he is also a critic of 
hierarchy in educational projects, emphasizes the importance of including the voices of 
marginalized and dehumanization people in dialogue. 
 
There are, however, differences between the community of inquiry and Freire’s vision of the 
cultural circle. In a community of inquiry, the teacher plays a role in steering the discussion and in 
deciding the topic to discuss. The teacher stands apart from the other participants and retains a 
level of epistemic authority. The coordinator of a cultural circle has a diminishing role; in the 
dialogue, the hierarchy breaks down and her status as an authority over her students fades--”the 
teacher-of-the-students and the students-of-the-teacher cease to exist and a new term emerges: 
teacher-student with students-teacher” (Freire, 2005, p. 80).  
 
The idea of critical thinking has different meanings for critical pedagogy and P4C. The latter is 
firmly within the Western tradition of critical thinking that focuses on a specific set of reasoning 
skills that are the foundation of the entire curriculum. Students with these skills are able apply 
them to the study of any subject. A critical thinking educational project would focus on teaching 
students to be rational thinkers who are capable of using the reasoning skills they learned to 
evaluate new evidence. Burbules and Berk (1999) write that the critical thinker “is something like a 
critical consumer of information; he or she is driven to seek reasons and evidence” (p. 47). The 
critical thinker in this tradition is ultimately concerned with minimizing false beliefs. 
 
In critical pedagogy, critical thinking goes beyond changing the individual to thinking about 
relations between teachers and students and power inequalities within institutional structures--”the 
endeavor to teach others to think critically is less a matter of fostering individual skills and 
dispositions, and more a consequence of the pedagogical relations, between teachers and students 
and among students, which promote it; furthermore, the object of thinking critically is not only 
against demonstrably false beliefs, but also those that are misleading, partisan, or implicated in the 
preservation of an unjust status quo” (Burbules & Berk, 1999, p. 49). For critical pedagogy, 
thinking critically means thinking politically as well. 
 
Critical P4C develops critical thinking in both these senses, to provide a set of reasoning skills and 
dispositions that aid in uncovering injustice within the status quo. We must reject, however, the 
idea of a static world; the critical thinker is not a detached observer and evaluator. The analysis of 
evidence in critical thinking happens in the world that is being read. Freire’s work was concerned 
with teaching literacy, both as reading words but also “reading the world” as a first step in naming 
and renaming the world. Western critical thinking, on the other hand, is most commonly applied to 
scientific and technical education.  
 
There have been attempts to apply critical pedagogy to other fields, for example mathematics; 
these question the supposed “value-free” nature of mathematical knowledge and increase 
mathematical literacy (Frankenstein, 1983; Cohen, 1997; Stinson et al. 2012). Teaching a critical 
mathematics looks at the ways mathematics and statistics are employed, especially in politics and 
the media--what claims are they being used to support, who gets to decide what counts as 
legitimate mathematical knowledge, and who is excluded from the field mathematical study. 
Frankenstein writes that critical mathematics rejects both the “common sense” view that 
mathematical truths is discovered and not created, and the cynical view that sees statistics as 
“self-serving lies” (p. 10). Instead a Freirean approach reflects on the roles of subjectivity and 
objectivity in the creation of mathematical knowledge. In her critical mathematics course she uses 
examples such as the government making military spending appear less through the manipulation 





intelligence of ethnic groups, appear significant and meaningful, when there is not a strong 
correlation (p. 10). Critical P4C takes the opposite route of incorporating elements of critical 
thinking in the Western sense into a critical pedagogy project, that is adopting ‘value-free’ 
reasoning skills for a value-laden dialogue.  
 
Lipman’s P4C finds itself within a liberal framework of thinking about education, heavily informed 
by Deweyian principles. Education, in the liberal view, can fix problems by making students that 
are more rational and more equipped to evaluate evidence. However the demands of the modern 
school have have forced some aspects of Dewey’s pedagogy to be sidelined. The school, for Dewey, 
should be teaching through experiences which beget other experiences, having a transformative 
effect on the world. Freire’s work is a part of the radical tradition of education that examines 
oppressive structures in the world and seeks a way to change them. Liberal education changes 
individuals to better navigate their social environment; radical education questions why the 
environment is structured in a way that dehumanizes some and thinks of alternative ways of 
organizing people. 
 
Critical Philosophy for Children 
 
Teachers intending to coordinate a dialogue would need to do their research beforehand. Critical 
P4C should explore questions that face the young people in their day-to-day experience. However 
the facilitator should not refer only to development psychology research to construct a view of the 
child, as we saw with Matthews, such accounts miss what makes children’s philosophical insights 
valuable. Also Freire would argue that the “standard and normal” accounts of developmental 
psychology denies the voices of children who have been silenced by oppression. Freire advises 
facilitators and coordinators to integrate with the community prior to any educational activity. So 
prior to beginning the pedagogical process, facilitators must research the students’ lives.  
 
There are multiple levels of research that can be done. First is speaking directly to the students. 
What philosophical questions do they have? How much do they know about philosophy and 
philosophers? What media do they consume? How aware of politics and social issues are they? 
What do they want to learn? Second, meet with parents and teachers. What is the social 
environment of the classroom? What are the social dynamics of the students? What are they 
talking about? Third, study the community and larger cultural context the students are situated 
within. To what social classes do the students belong? What are the dynamics of race and class in 
the students’ environment? 
 
Once this has been satisfactorily completed, facilitators and students can begin the lesson, usually 
sitting together in a circle to emphasize the break from traditional hierarchic roles. The lesson can 
begin a number of ways, with a reading from text, using art or a picture book as the catalyst, or a 
warm-up activity. The facilitator should first direct questions to the group as a whole, then to 
individual participants who may be in need of motivation. These questions should build upon the 
answers given in the discussion. The facilitator should limit this unless it is absolutely necessary; 
the goal is to incite enough for the dialogue to sustain itself. At some point, the facilitator is no 
longer the primary figure in the dialogue, and she becomes a member of the group (Freire, 1971).  
 
This is in many ways an ideal situation. It is unlikely that a dialogue will reach the point where 
everyone is completely equal; the dialogue exists within a society where adults have authority over 
children and where people are treated differently based on race, gender, and class. A critical P4C 
dialogue might never overcome these influences, but this should be the discursive goal that 
participants are working for. Some might argue that the adult-child relationship adds another 





should model the kind of thinking the dialogue aims at, that is, retaining the mindset of love, faith, 
humility, trust, and critical thinking that Freire stressed.  
 
When dealing with children, the adult should see a difference between correcting a child for being 
wrong about some factual claim and engaging in wrong behavior. The former should be discussed; 
the latter implies a limit to what dialogue with children can achieve. There are points when the 
teacher-of-the-students must reappear as a figure of authority, for example, if a student physically 
assaults another. A dialogue seeks to find a balance between the goals of ideal discussion and the 
reality of childhood. The point when the adult should step in as an authority figure is unclear. 
Physical violence or self-destructive acts should be prevented but is there a line of thinking that 
children shouldn’t engage in? There is no easy answer to this question. Freire would urge us to 
consider why some topics are not up for discussion by children and what effects this might have on 
silencing children’s opinions or questions. 
 
Knowledge, in critical P4C, is socially constructed and legitimized. A dialogue thus should lead to 
questions of not only the hierarchical structure of the classroom but the larger society as well. 
Social norms should be a subject of discussion and students should question these norms to 
uncover their hidden meanings. The dialogue must be a safe space for students to engage with the 
peers about controversial topics, and, in the spirit of a community of inquiry, build upon each 
other’s ideas. 
 
Remember that conscientização is the goal for all participants in the dialogue. The teacher’s goal 
should be to become a student-teacher with teacher-students. Letting go of the authority that 
comes with the role of teacher can be daunting, and many educators fear that they would lose 
control of the classroom in the process. Lipman, Matthews, and Freire would respond with an 
appeal to an inherent desire of students to engage in dialogue, that children and, for Freire, the 
oppressed want to be respected intellectually. An important consideration is that the shift from 
authoritarian teacher to co-inquirer doesn’t happen immediately; the teacher’s authority wanes as 
the students become used to the new dynamics of their relationship to the teacher.  
 
Freire writes that a component of banking education is the teacher’s confusion between their 
intellectual authority with professional authority (2005, p. 73). In modern public education, 
students have been socialized to accept this same confusion. Thus students may resist the 
dismantling of intellectual hierarchy or assume that this also means the end of professional 
authority of the teacher. Both of these cases pose a problem to creating a dynamic community of 
inquiry. In the former, students may refuse to contribute to the discussion opinions or arguments 
that haven’t been justified through the banking education that have experienced. In the latter, 
students may engage in disruptive behavior (cf. Giroux, 1983).  
 
This issue is discussed by Freire and other theorists; however, when working specifically with 
younger children, it takes more prominence. Future work in this area is important for critical P4C. 
Freire notes that in a dialogue arguments based on authority are invalid and that for it to function, 
“authority must be on the side of freedom” (2005, p. 80). Perhaps adult learners are more apt to 
accept the distinction between professional and intellectual authority, hence the reason that there 
is little attention paid to how to convey this to adults. For Freire, ‘reading the word and the world’ 
is the human vocation; so people have an innate desire to engage in dialogue and the facilitator's 
role is to break them out of the banking model. This process is likely to take a different shape when 
working with children who have a closer engagement with banking education, assuming most of 
their education thus far has fit that model. How can educators explain this distinction to children to 
accept authority in some situations--when a parent says not to run with scissors--but not others, 
such as when a banking-model classroom? Do children need positive authority figures and how can 





be forced to accept certain ideas without dialogue or debate? Critical P4C practitioners and 
theorists should carefully consider these questions.  
 
As an example of a P4C course with critical pedagogy in mind, working with Portland State 
University’s Philosophy Department, my colleagues and I engaged 12- to 15-year-old students in a 
number of philosophy lessons centered on life in a city. For their final project, groups of students 
designed their own ideal cities. The students’ utopias showed a wide range of creativity. Instead of 
thinking how to take the pre-existing concept of city and build on that to make it more efficient, 
students rethought the the goals and principles of a city. One city was focused on maximizing 
human enjoyment and combatting boredom, while another attempted to create an egalitarian 
society without sacrificing productivity. The students demonstrated both lateral and critical 
thinking. The cities showed the students’ capacity to, on one hand, think unconventionally about 




Why implement a critical philosophy for children? For P4C practitioners and theorists, incorporating 
critical pedagogies can be helpful for advancing the movement in a direction that is specifically 
concerned with human freedom. Critical pedagogy is controversial because of its unabashed 
political nature. Freire and his followers are heavily influenced by thinkers in the Marxist tradition. 
However, educating is not a politically-neutral occupation; Freire (1987) believed that the neutral 
teacher, in not being literate of the political nature of her actions, serves the interests of power (p. 
212). Applying a Freirean reading to P4C can show us the hidden contradictions that may be 
present, in a sense being critical of critical thinking. Educators that are committed to helping their 
students become more liberated need to be vigilant to the ways that they might be inadvertently 
reinforcing dominance and oppression.   
 
Working with children adds some complications to a critical education project. Completely 
eliminating the teacher-student hierarchy in the classroom is an unachievable ideal. There might 
even be a necessary distinction that has to be in place. The teacher can play a role in modeling 
positive types of intellectual behavior. The student sees that the teacher is not equal in some 
respects. When inequality is seen as essential, that is, there is something internal to the student 
that makes her less than the teacher, the motivation to want to learn suffers; if the student 
believes there is some unchangeable flaw in her character, she’ll be cynical about the use of 
education to better herself. In a dialogue the goal should be to question hierarchies based on race, 
gender, class, and status in society. P4C begins from an authoritarian, top-down model of 
education and works toward a less hierarchical model. Using a critical pedagogy with children 
requires us to decide how egalitarian the classroom can be. In public schools, the demands of the 
curriculum will be more extreme, particularly regarding standardized tests, though alternative 
schools, particularly those that are student-centered, provide more opportunity to expand 
education beyond the standard paradigm and the banking method. 
 
Lipman questioned the dichotomy between child and adult; he claimed that children could do 
philosophy and could employ reasoning if given the chance. Children are able to think like adults 
think, albeit with less complexity and depth. In Matthews, we see childhood as a state of wonder. 
The insight is not that children can follow the same line of reasoning as adults, but that children 
sometimes think in terms that are outside of what normally counts as reasoning. Through dialogue 
with children, insights develop that can provide philosophically-interesting pathways for adults to 
explore and “results in a profound critique of the normative adult view of the child and of its 
expression in the ‘science as usual’ of developmental psychology” (Vansieleghem & Kennedy, 2011, 






The second generation of P4C turns to questions of power relations within the context of education, 
personal meaning, and self-actualization. This generation builds upon the work of its predecessors, 
adapting their ideas to the new socio-political environment; in a sense advocates of this generation 
are updating the work of Lipman and Matthews for the contemporary world. However they also 
criticize aspect of earlier generations, particularly Lipman’s emphasis on analytical reasoning which 
seems to have little connection to the goal of seeking personal meaning. For theorists and 
educators of the second generation, philosophy can’t be confined to the classroom. Reasoned 
deliberation is necessary in many aspects of life in an information-rich, increasingly-complex world 
(Van der Leeuw, 2009, p. 111-113). P4C from this approach attempts to provide children with the 
skills to be rational actors in the world. Critical P4C shares much in common with the second 
generation, and uses its predecessors as a foundation to rethink prior assumptions about teacher 
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